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Abstract 
 
Recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Asia, Europe, and 
Africa have caused severe impacts on the broiler sector through production losses, trade 
restrictions and negative shocks to demand. This study develops a multimarket econometric 
model that is the basis of simulations to assess the spread and market implications of a 
potential HPAI outbreak in U.S. broiler industry. It takes into account market power that 
might exist within the livestock and meat sectors and endogenizes the optimal production 
condition on the model system. The results imply that the HPAI shocks affect prices at 
different marketing levels unequally and change the price margins along the supply chain 
with the existence of market power. The change in the price margin, although statistically 
significant, is quite small in absolute value. 
 
Keywords: animal disease; broilers; HPAI; market power; meat market price margins; 
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POTENTIAL HPAI SHOCKS AND WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF 
MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. BROILER INDUSTRY 
 
1. Introduction 
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has been recognized as a great concern for 
broiler production, wildlife conservation and public health. Between 2003 and August 2009, 
62 countries reported HPAI cases in their domestic poultry or wildlife (Narrod 2009). The 
World Bank estimates that the HPAI disease could cost the world economy between US$800 
billion dollars and US$3 trillion dollars during this six year period (Narrod 2009). HPAI is 
highly contagious and causes severe illness in poultry with high mortality; it can cause 
mortality rates of 90% or higher in domesticated poultry within 48 hours of infection (CDC). 
With concern for transmission to humans, outbreaks of HPAI have caused major changes in 
demand, led to an increase in costs to producers through additional input use, and caused 
price volatility which could in turn induce dramatic market instability.  The United States 
exports more poultry product than any other country in the world. When export markets are 
taken into account, even a relatively small outbreak has the potential to cause large welfare 
loss, especially if trade is restricted. Although mainly affecting the broiler sector and egg 
sectors, an HPAI shock is expected to influence other related livestock sectors as well. 
To understand the potential welfare effects of HPAI, we consider the transmission of 
HPAI shocks through various stages of the broiler supply chain and through other livestock 
and related agricultural markets. The impacts of shocks are determined by the behavior of 
market agents who are involved in the transactions. Price characterizes the linkages between 
markets. Food scares can have differential effects on downstream suppliers and upstream 
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suppliers, i.e., the extent to which price adjustments may be asymmetric. As an example, 
both Sanjuán and Dawson (2003) and Lloyd et al. (2006) found that the retail price of beef 
decreased significantly less than farm level price in response to BSE outbreaks in the U.K., 
and resulted in a substantial increase in the farm-retail margin and widened the food crisis. 
Even though the causes of asymmetric price transmission are complicated and 
multidimensional, market power is potentially an important explanation for this differential. 
Under competitive conditions, shocks impact prices at each marketing level equally. “If 
market power exists then the spread between retail and producer supply prices behaves 
differently since price setting by the sector with market power will be reflected in the mark 
down that the firms can earn, and so affects the spread. ” (Lloyd et al. 2006).  
Livestock, poultry and meat sectors are vertically integrated in the U.S.  The linking of 
successive stages of production and marketing through ownership or contracting is 
widespread. For example, over 88 percent of the value of production in the broiler and egg 
industry are under ownership integration and contracts (MacDonald et al. 2004). Particularly, 
the processing industries become much more concentrated. Large processing establishments 
dominate production in all major meat sectors. In the year of 2005, the four largest meat 
processors processed 79%, 64% and 53% of purchases in cattle, hog and broiler industry, 
respectively (USDA 2009). Vertical integration between producing and processing activities 
in the meat industry results in reduced transaction costs, more uniform food products and 
gains in economic efficiency. However, this vertical integration generally increases market 
power as shown below, and could increase welfare loss from an HPAI outbreak. With the 
increased importance of vertical integration, local farmers have access to only a few buyers 
and may be forced to accept a reduced distribution of profit or increased risk. Transportation 
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costs and product characteristics (such as perishability or quality deterioration) could limit 
the area over which products can be shipped (MacDonald et al. 2004). As MacDonald and 
colleagues (2004) indicate, contracts may extend market power by deterring entry by 
potential rivals, limiting price competition among existing rivals and facilitating 
discriminatory pricing.   
In this paper we focus only on monopsony (buyer) market power, a situation which is 
traditionally more important in livestock and meat industries than monopoly (seller) power. 
The following questions are considered: Do the price effects of concentration vary across 
markets? How would the distribution of economic welfare differ across levels of market 
power among agents following an HPAI shock? 
Many recent studies have conducted analyses on how Avian Influenza influences the 
economic outcomes of livestock and meat industries in the United States (Brown et al. 2007, 
Paarlberg et al. 2007, Djunaidi et al. 2007, and Fabiosa et al. 2007).However, these studies 
assume that the livestock and meat industries are competitive; none of these studies has 
accounted for market structure in modeling the price transmission of HPAI shocks. The 
principle objective of this research is to conduct an HPAI risk and cost analysis that accounts 
for potential market power within the whole meat supply chain. The paper is organized as 
follows: First, we review the literature. Second, we develop a theoretical model to examine 
the potential impacts of market power on the distribution of economic welfare following a 
food scare. Third, we conduct empirical analyses to measure the magnitude of market power 
for U.S. meat sectors. Fourth, we use an epidemiological-economic model to conduct 
simulation analyses on the spread and effects of a potential HPAI outbreak in the U.S. broiler 
industry. Lastly, we discuss conclusions and implications of our work. 
 
5 
 
2. Review of literature 
Understanding market power implications in the food sectors is important. Following 
the work of Appelbaum (1982), a number of studies have examined market power in 
agricultural markets. The GIPSA/USDA study (1996) summarized the findings of previous 
studies on the effects of concentration in the red meat packing industry, the results on market 
power are “mixed” and not consistent across studies. With recent consolidation in the red 
meat sector, the newer studies may be more relevant. Several recent studies find evidence of 
market power in the beef and pork packing industry (Muth and Wohlgenant 1999; 
Quagrainie, et al., 2003). However, only a few studies have examined the broiler sector to see 
if buyers exert a significant amount of market power. Bernard and Willett (1996) analyzed 
asymmetric price relationships in the U.S. broiler industry at the regional and national levels. 
Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006) illustrated the poultry grower’s hold-up problem. Their 
results showed moderate empirical evidence that  under-investment by growers depends on 
the integrator’s market power in the broiler industry production contract. Key and 
MacDonald (2008) suggest a “small but economically meaningful effect” of local 
monopsony power in the U.S. broiler industry using farm survey data.     
There is a rich literature that investigates the farm-retail price margin and what factors 
influence price transmission. High concentration as well as increased vertical dependencies 
in agricultural sectors is evident in most developed countries. Suppliers may pass on only a 
small fraction of an input cost decrease to output price or, alternatively, pass all of input cost 
increases on to the output price (or both) when market power exists. Thus price signals are 
allowed to be passed up or down by market agents to capture welfare and profits for 
themselves relative to the competitive market (Azzam 1999, Meyer and von Cramon-
 
6 
 
Taubadel 2004, Miller and Hayenga 2001, Lopez, Azzam and Liron-Espana 2002). For 
meatpacking industries, empirical studies indicated that concentration may limit competition 
and enable meatpacking firms to exert monopoly power and keep prices paid to producers 
low (Azzam 1997, Marion and Geithman 1995, Richards, Patterson and Acharya 2001). 
In this study, a major effort is directed to the modeling and analysis of HPAI impacts 
on livestock industries when market power is taken into account. Hence, the estimation and 
measurement of market power is critical. A number of studies have explored the methods of 
estimating market power in food industries. The empirical implementation can be classified 
among several approaches. Our study uses an approach developed by Hyde and Jeffrey 
(1999). They developed a new technique for measuring market power in the Australian beef, 
lamb, and pork markets simultaneously by using a structural approach which allows 
estimation for more than one product.  
 
3. Theoretical framework 
We first develop a theoretical model to illustrate the potential impacts of market power 
on the price margin and distribution of economic welfare following a food scare such as an 
HPAI outbreak. Following the assumption used in Schroeter and Azzam’s study (1990), we 
assume “the existence of fully integrated firms spanning the farm-to-retail meat marketing 
channel and ignore all vertical relationships within the industry”. This implies we do not 
decompose the farm-retail margin into farm-wholesale and wholesale-retail margins to 
identify if the exercise of market power occurs at the wholesale level or at the retail level. 
The model structure includes: producer supply, consumer demand on final product and retail 
supply. We assume that the final products produced by all firms are homogenous, and the 
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industry technology is characterized by constant returns to scale. Furthermore, to concentrate 
the model on the implications of market power, we simply assume the input-output 
coefficient to be 1. The food shocks enter into the model by taking the form of exogenous 
demand and/or supply shifters.            
The inverse producer’s supply can be expressed as 
( )0 , sp f q Z=                                                        (1) 
where 0p  is the price received by the producer, and q  is producer supply. sZ denotes the 
supply shifter caused by the food scare or outbreak. 
The consumer’s inverse demand for the retail product is 
( ), dp D q Z=                                                         (2) 
where p represents retail price. dZ  denotes the demand shifter caused by the food scare. 
The representative firm’s profit maximization can be expressed as 
     ( ) ( )' 'p p q q C qλ+ =                                                      (3) 
where λ  represents the level of market power, and the value of λ  ranges from zero (perfect 
competition) to one (monopsony). Values for λ lying between zero and one imply the 
presence of an intermediate degree of market power. ( )'C q  is the marginal cost of the firm 
and can be assumed to be a linear function of producer level price 0p  and marketing cost w .  
( )' 0C q p w= +                                                         (4) 
Let ( )( )/ /q p p qη = ∂ ∂  which is less than zero denote the price elasticity of demand in 
the retail market. Then equation (3) can be rearranged as 
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 01p p wλη
⎛ ⎞+ = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                                                      (5) 
In order to obtain the industry-level expression of equation (5), we need to aggregate 
among firms. The industry-level conjectural variation interpreter industryλ  can be estimated as 
the weighted average of individual conjectural variation interpreter λ , with firms’ market 
shares as weights. As in many studies of market power (e.g., Azzam and Pagoulatos; Lopez, 
Wann and Sexton), we simply assume that the market share of each firm on the final market 
is identical. Thus, the conjectural variation interpreter at the industry level is industryλ λ= .  
         Using (1), (2) and (5), the endogenous variables ( )* 0* *, ,q p p  can be derived by 
implicit solutions. The price spread * * 0*r p p= −  can provide insight on how market power 
would change the impacts of the shocks. If market power exists, the exogenous shocks 
influence the prices at different supply chain stages to varying degrees. As a result, the price 
margin might be widened or narrowed depending on the demand elasticities as well as 
interactions of exogenous shifters. In the meantime, market power plays a role in determining 
the magnitude and distribution of welfare impacts. The producer’s surplus  * * *V p q=  can be 
expressed as a function of the price elasticities vector η , marketing cost w  and market 
power parameter λ . In general form, the impacts of a demand shock and a supply shock 
caused by HPAI can be provided by  
( ) ( )0* , , , ,
d d d
p w p wdr
dZ Z Z
η λ η λ∂ ∂= −∂ ∂                                          
(6) 
( ) ( )0* , , , ,
s s s
p w p wdr
dZ Z Z
η λ η λ∂ ∂= −∂ ∂                                         
(7) 
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and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* , , , ,, , , ,
d d d
p w q wdV q w p w
dZ Z Z
η λ η λη λ η λ∂ ∂= ⋅ − ⋅∂ ∂                   
(8)
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* , , , ,, , , ,
s s s
p w q wdV q w p w
dZ Z Z
η λ η λη λ η λ∂ ∂= ⋅ − ⋅∂ ∂                  
(9)
 
respectively. 
          In the beef and pork industries, marketing contracts are the prevalent method of 
vertical coordination. The marketing contract mainly specifies delivered quantities, product 
specification, compensation and quality control (MacDonald et al. 2004). The farmer makes 
most of his or her decisions which include how much to produce and how to produce. Here 
0p  is farm level price, i.e, steer price for the beef industry and barrow-gilt price for the pork 
industry. 
           Unlike the beef and pork industries, most farms in the broiler, egg and turkey 
industries are linked to an integrator through production contracts. In a production contract, 
the integrator is engaged in many of the farmer’s decisions like providing chicks, feed, 
veterinary services and retains ownership of important production inputs. In most cases, 
farmers invest only in production facilities according to the firm’s specifications and certain 
management strategies. Under production contracts, farmers are paid for farming services, 
not for the products. Therefore, here, the producer’s price 0p  is the wholesale level price 
instead of the farm level price. The impacts of market power will be transmitted along the 
whole supply chain and result in a different new market equilibrium compared with perfect 
competition. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Measurement of market power 
To examine the impacts of market structure on economic outcomes in the food sector 
following an HPAI scare, it is important to measure the market power that might exist for 
each product within the livestock and meat sectors. Our study draws upon the method of 
Hyde and Jeffrey (1999) who simultaneously estimated an Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) model for Australia’s retail meat sectors, a market power parameter and a marginal 
cost function for each product. This approach is more efficient than examining each good in 
isolation because “it makes use of information obtained from demand theory, such as price 
homogeneity restriction” (Hyde and Jeffrey 1999).  Due to the substitution between meat 
products on the demand side, the prices of all meat products are included in the demand 
functions for each meat product. This enables us to capture substitution between meat 
products by consumers in response to relative price changes, which is important for 
examining the net impacts on one specific market. We modify Hyde and Jeffrey’s model by 
analyzing market power in the whole supply chain instead of at the retail level only. In our 
study, the model estimates simultaneously the demand of major meat products: chicken, 
pork, beef, turkey and egg.  
The demand component recognizes that in the very short run, meat production is 
essentially fixed, and thus price determination is at the retail level. The demand component 
also recognizes that the consumers’ adjustment to changes in relative prices and income is 
not instantaneous, and consumers of the five meat products have preferences that are weakly 
separable.  
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The AIDS model includes expenditure share equations for the meat-poultry products 
that are related to the logarithm of total expenditure and the logarithms of relative prices. The 
model can be written as follows: 
( )5 1 ln ln /i i ij j ijs p X Pα γ β== + +∑                                      (10) 
where is  represent the share of commodity  i, jp  denotes the retail price of good j , X  is 
the total expenditure on the five meat products, and P is price index which is defined as: 
( )50 1ln ln 1/ 2 ln lni ij i ji i jP p p pα γ== + +∑ ∑ ∑                        (11) 
The AIDS model satisfies the aggregation restriction 5 5
1 1
1, 0,i ii iα β= == =∑ ∑  and 
homogeneity, 5
1
0ijj γ= =∑ , and symmetry, ij jiγ γ=  ,which can be imposed with parametric 
restrictions automatically.  
In order to examine the potential impacts of market power on price reaction elasticities, 
the “integrated” firm’s profit maximization conditions are considered to be endogenous in the 
demand system. One of the favorable characteristics of the AIDS model is that it is plausible 
to incorporate theoretical restrictions on the system.  
          Recall the firm’s maximization problem 
( ) ( )' 'i i i i i i ip p q q C qλ+ =                                            (12) 
where [ ]0,1iλ ∈  is the parameter that captures market power (conjectural variation). That is, 
in a competitive market, we expect iλ  is equal to zero.  
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( )'i iC q is the marginal cost of product i . Differing from Hyde and Jeffrey’s study, in this 
study 0ip  and w  denote producer price and marketing cost along the whole supply chain, 
respectively. 
( )' 0i i i i i iC q a b p d w= + +                                                   (13) 
By substituting (13) and ( )'i ip q  derived from the AIDS model into (12), the first order 
condition can be rewritten as  
1
0 1
1 /
j ji i i
i i i i i
j ii ij i j ii i i
p qsp a b p d w
q s s
λ λ
γ β γ β
−
≠
⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞= + + − × −⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟− − +⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∑              (14) 
Then the AIDS model is estimated using a double logarithmic demand system by imposing 
parameter restrictions and the profit maximization restriction (14). The market power 
parameter iλ  can be obtained. The magnitude of price asymmetry depends not only on the 
level of market power but also on the demand elasticities. The data used in the demand 
system are obtained from USDA/ERS and NASS. The estimation in this study is based on  
96 quarterly observations that cover quarterly periods 1981:1 - 2004:4. Table 1 provides the 
regression results.  
          Table 1 lists coefficients of statistical inference. Most parameters are statistically 
significant at the 5% level or less. These findings indicate the estimated market power index 
λ   is statistically significant for the beef, pork and chicken sectors, which indicates that 
market power exists in these industries to some extent. The results also show that the overall 
concentration at the national level is quite small in terms of magnitude. 
 
 
 
13 
 
Table 1. Model estimates 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
1α   -0.0012 44γ  -0.0096 1d   0.0163*** 
2α    0.1432*** 45γ  0.0000*** 2d   0.0021*** 
3α    1.0152*** 55γ  0.0393*** 3d   0.0014** 
4α   -0.0016*** 1β  0.1269*** 4d   0.0000*** 
5α   -0.1557*** 2β  0.0256*** 5d   0.0001*** 
11γ   0.0903*** 3β  -0.2123*** 0a   0.0000 
12γ  -0.0527*** 4β  0.0054*** 1λ   0.0342*** 
13γ  -0.0161*** 1a  -0.0060*** 2λ   0.0499*** 
14γ   0.0378*** 2a  -0.0010*** 3λ   0.1607*** 
15γ  -0.0594*** 3a  -0.0007 4λ   -0.0015 
22γ   0.0981*** 4a  0.0001* 5λ   0.00004 
23γ  -0.0089*** 5a  0.0033*   
24γ  -0.0373*** 1b  0.00001   
25γ   0.0009*** 2b  0.0000   
33γ   -0.0033 3b  0.00002**   
34γ   0.0091*** 4b  0.00000   
35γ   0.0192*** 5b  0.00008*   
Note: *** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance level 
                                                    1-beef; 2-pork; 3-poultry; 4-turkey; 5-egg 
 
 
4.2. Economic impacts of HPAI under market power 
 
4.2.1. Economic model 
An epidemiological-economic model is developed to simulate the spread and effects of 
the disease in the poultry and other meat sectors. This approach differs from the study of 
Lloyd et al. (2006) which adopted a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to verify the 
influences of BSE disease on the farm-retail margin. Instead, here, a state-transition model of 
the transmission of Avian Influenza developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) was used along with an economic model. The epidemiological model was developed 
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to incorporate the dynamics of influenza A virus infection with birds and estimate the effect 
of different risk profiles on the final disease prevalence and infection rate. (Please refer to 
Fabiosa et al. for further details and references.) The economic model developed by the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University uses 
parameters generated by the epidemiological model to validate the potential effects of shocks 
associated with the disease on prices along the supply chain, domestic consumption, export, 
production and ending stock under different scenarios.   
The CARD model is a multimarket partial equilibrium model and provides a complete 
depiction of key biological and economic relationships within five livestock and meat 
industries. The modeling effort updates previous work described in Jensen et al. (1989), and 
Buhr and Hayenga (1994). The model revisions accommodate updated results from re-
estimated market models, added livestock sectors, and new technical production parameters. 
The model allows for components envisioned in the simulations of an Avian Influenza 
outbreak in the broiler and egg industries. The current extended model system includes five 
meat sectors: broiler and chicken meat; turkey and turkey meat; layer and eggs; beef cattle 
and beef; and hog and pork. Each market in the model is assumed to be national in scope, and 
has a single national equilibrium price.  
The structure of the model includes live animal supply, meat supply, meat demand, and 
price margin components. The econometric specification provides an abstraction of a 
complex system and aids in synthesizing information and causal relationships into a 
comprehensible form. Aggregate demand and supply can be partitioned to equations that 
define the behavioral relationship between quantities and price and other event factors. The 
specification of the five supply sectors is based on a partial adjustment-adaptive expectations 
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framework and is driven by the feed cost variable, output price and expected output on 
particular stages. The processes include biological restrictions inherent in livestock 
production, the appropriate lags to capture time periods required in production, technical 
parameters, and accounting identities to ensure consistency in the stock as well as flow 
variables. Relevant trade flows for the products involved are also modeled. In a word, the 
supply components of the models are determined by the biological relationships in the 
production process as well as on the economic considerations of meat producers. 
Under the assumption that supply is fixed in the short run (less than one quarter), the 
meat demand system is estimated by an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) which 
includes expenditure share equations for the all meat products. The linkage takes the 
assumption that consumers adjust their purchasing behaviors based on relative retail meat 
prices and the cross-commodity effects originate on the demand side. The marginal 
specifications provide a price linkage from the farm market to the retail market. The potential 
existence of market power and the optimal production condition for each sector are not 
included in the CARD model. In this study, we update the estimation of the AIDS demand 
system by accounting for market power and its impacts on economic outcomes. 
The model has a simultaneous econometric framework where market equilibrium price 
and quantity for the five livestock sectors are jointly determined. Economic activity is 
initiated by the breeding decisions of livestock producers, and these are linked recursively to 
all other variables of the model system and simultaneously interact to determine each other’s 
value. The supply and demand sides of each model are linked by market clearing conditions. 
Current prices influence future production and current consumption decisions. For this 
analysis, input markets are assumed to be exogenous. When the scenarios introduce a shock, 
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responses captured through elasticities on the endogenous variables will shift the demand or 
supply curve, and thus induce price movements.  Thereafter supply recovers gradually and a 
stable supply path can be obtained again.  A new equilibrium is achieved in which supply 
and demand are in balance. While a shock on the broiler industry may have an initial impact 
on the industry itself, the interdependencies between the industries and the supply chain 
integration ensure that the others are also affected to some extent. The influences of the 
shocks are different because of the differences in the endogenous variables’ elasticities and in 
the relative variability of the series for the endogenous variables. The effects of market 
power involve adjustments on demand elasticities, which influence equilibrium prices and 
quantities, as well as the distribution of social cost through market relationships. 
 
4.2.2. Scenarios 
Following Fabiosa et al. (2007), the simulated market scenarios are classified 
according to the length and severity of the outbreak, number of birds removed from the 
market, percentage reduction in domestic and export demand for poultry products, duration 
of the demand shock, assumptions on diversion, and use of product destined for export 
markets. Since it is challenging to know in advance the range of an outbreak, this study 
examines three possible scenarios of the extent of HPAI on broilers and layers: high, medium 
and low. The epidemiological model generates data on infection rates and effects on national 
broiler production required by the economic model. An infection rate of 0.2% and duration of 
90 days are generated for the low shock scenario. Infection rate and duration for medium and 
high shock scenarios are 0.4% and 180 days, 0.7% and 270 days, respectively. There is 
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depopulation of pullets, chicks hatched and slaughter ready birds, applied in equal 
percentages to each sector spread out during the period of the outbreak.  
On the domestic demand side, consumers are assumed to respond to an AI outbreak by 
decreasing purchase of chicken during the quarter when the outbreak happens. The 
decreasing level is 5%, 8% and 14% for low, medium and high scenarios, respectively. For 
the high scenario, the consumption decreases by 10% on the quarter following the outbreak, 
while there is no decline on the following quarters for the low and medium scenarios. 
For export, we assume exports would be 50%, 25% and 10% below normal levels for 
the high, medium and low scenarios, and shocks on export market fade gradually and are 
gone after 135, 270, and 405 days, respectively. Disposition of product destined for export is 
also specified. If none of the retained product is “diverted” to secondary or alternative 
markets (e.g., pet food, or rendered product), any product that is not exported would be 
consumed in the U.S. or added to ending stocks (cold storage). For each of the three 
scenarios (low, medium, and high), three levels of export diversion, 0%, 50%, and 100%, are 
considered. The assumptions underlying the scenarios for disease outbreaks for egg layers 
can be described similarly. The assumptions of each scenario are summarized in Table A-1 
(see Appendix). 
 
4.2.3. Empirical results 
The data used in the economic model include time-series data on the levels of 
production, price, consumption, exports, and stock for the period between the year of 1981 
and 2004. The model is also calibrated by dynamic simulation over the same periods. 
Through calibration, the baseline-solved value of the endogenous variables equals the actual 
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value. The baseline projections are developed in the first quarter of 2000 and cover the period 
2000.1-2004.2. Effects of alternative scenarios are measured relative to this period. The firm-
level production impacts and market-level changes in equilibrium prices and output are 
evaluated. Table A-2 and Figure A-1~A-7 (in the Appendix) provide simulation results of the 
broiler sector for the base line and the high-range shock with 0% export diversion under the 
environment of market power. The first four quarters of the scenarios are listed individually 
in the table and the remaining quarters are averaged annually since the impacts of external 
shocks become smaller. The results from other cases and other sectors are not listed here 
because of space limitations. 
The simulation results indicate that if HPAI is introduced (model shock occurs in 
2000.1) into the U.S., restrictions imposed on chicken exports, even when combined with 
bird mortality and production impacts will result in excess supply in the domestic market. 
Consequently, the HPAI domestic market price of poultry products is lower than before 
because producers are not able to adjust production decisions in the very short run. From 
Table A-2, a 50% decrease in export results in approximately a 35% decrease in the retail 
chicken price. After trade restrictions are removed and export markets can begin to recover, 
the simulation reveals chicken prices recover above the level without an HPAI shock. 
Producers respond to the reduction of poultry prices by operating on a lower production 
function. But the long run impact of the HPAI shock on production is generally quite small.  
Only a larger demand or supply shock results in long run production decreasing by more than 
one percent from the baseline scenario. Producers are able to recover after the shock and 
sometimes achieve higher production than before the shock. As the retail price decreases, the 
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ending stocks and per capita consumption of chicken increase due to the decrease in retail 
price.  
The HPAI shocks also affect the other meat markets to some extent. For example, the 
HPAI outbreak has a negative demand shock on poultry. At the same time, the increase in 
chicken supply dominates market response and market prices decrease. The fall in poultry 
prices has a negative effect on demand for other meat products and leads to decreases in the 
prices in other meat markets. The magnitude of the substitution effect depends on 
substitution elasticities among these meat products and the degree of market power.   
Table A-4 (in the Appendix) presents the simulation results of chicken’s total value 
under the environment of market power in comparison to a situation with perfect competition
( )0λ = . We find the absolute value of the change in chicken’s total value is higher with the 
existence of market power. That is, market power is more likely to lead to a greater change in 
the producer’s surplus and deepen the effects of HPAI.  
 
Figure 1. Percentage change in chicken's total value (with and without market power) 
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However, as can be seen in Figure 1, the difference between the two scenarios is small 
and it amounts to no more than 0.2% change compared to perfect competition. The vertical 
dashed line in the figure identifies the periods with trade restrictions and without restrictions 
(when the trade restrictions are relaxed).                        
The changing patterns of the egg sector are similar to those observed in the poultry 
sector except that per-capita consumption of eggs decreases from the beginning. Simulation 
results are summarized in Table A-3 and Figures A-8~A-14 (in the Appendix). For the egg 
sector, there are almost no differences between the simulations in case of perfect competition 
and market power. This is not surprising because we found no market power in that industry. 
Although the existence of market power has varying impacts on different meat 
products, in poultry markets, producers are paid for farming services instead of products. We 
analyze if there is a change in the price margin at the retail level relative to the wholesale 
level in the presence of the HPAI shock. 
Without the existence of market power, the demand and supply shocks play no role in 
determining the price margin. Correspondingly, if market power does exist, then the demand 
or/and the supply shifter will influence the wholesale and retail prices to varying degrees and 
thus change the price margin.  The econometric analyses of Lloyd et al. (2006) show that the 
price margin is positively affected by the demand shifter and negatively affected by the 
supply shifter. Whether and how an HPAI outbreak would change the price margin depends 
on which effect is dominant. We denote by 0ip  and 1ip  the baseline (no shock) and forecasted 
(with shock) poultry prices, where i indicates the wholesale ( )i w= and retail ( )i r=  levels. 
Then we can obtain the change of the forecasted price margin and the baseline price margin 
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( ) ( )1 1 0 0r w r wp p p p− −− . Table A-5 (in the Appendix) and Figures 2 and 3 show the change in 
the poultry price margin resulting from an HPAI outbreak. 
         
Figure 2. Wholesale - Retail poultry                       Figure 3. Change in Wholesale - Retail 
    price margin                                                                poultry price margin 
                                                                                                                          
The results illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the wholesale-retail margin of 
poultry products decreases for the first eight quarters following the shock. Recall that 
immediately after the outbreak of HPAI, the large scale export ban (supply shifter) leads to 
excess supply in the domestic market. Due to the lag structure of the supply functions, 
decreased exports are associated with a retail price decrease that is more than the wholesale 
price decrease, and thus narrows the price margin. At the same time, the concern over HPAI 
among consumers (demand shifter) also contributes to a lower retail price. With the existence 
of market power, the extent to which price adjustments occur is asymmetric. The wholesale 
level price decreases more than retail level price, and the demand shock has the effect of 
widening the price margin. The decrease in the price margin in this period suggests that the 
impacts of the supply shock dominate.  
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After the trade restriction is removed, the impact of the supply shock diminishes. On 
the demand side, the retail price rebounds with the recovery of poultry consumption. The 
wholesale level price response is lower than the retail price response.  The impact of the 
demand shifter is greater than that of the supply shifter. Therefore, from the ninth quarter 
after the outbreak, the wholesale-retail price margin starts to increase and becomes wider. 
The results are consistent with the empirical findings of Bernard and Willett (1996) who 
indicated that the national retail price of poultry products showed upward asymmetry from 
the wholesale to retail level. Because the magnitude of market power is relatively low in the 
poultry market, we find the change in the price margin is quite small in absolute value and 
remains nearly constant in the long run.  
          
Figure 4. Wholesale - Retail egg                         Figure 5. Change in Wholesale - Retail 
price margin                                                                egg price margin 
     
 The changes in the egg price margin resulting from the HPAI shock are shown in        
Table A-6 (in the Appendix) and Figures 4 and 5. The results indicate that the supply shock 
leads the price margin to decrease immediately after the outbreak of HPAI. Since there is no 
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evidence of market power in the egg sector, the price margin is not affected by HPAI after 
the trade restriction is removed. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study is motivated by an interest in determining the effects of a potential HPAI 
outbreak on the U.S. meat and poultry sectors and an effort to understand the influence of 
market structure on the U.S. meat sectors following the potential shock in the broiler sector. 
A simulation approach is used to analyze the responses of producers and consumers on a 
potential HPAI scare in a market setting. Specifically, this study recognizes that suppliers in 
the meat industry may exert market power to make adjustments that affect the market 
environment in which they operate. The results suggest that the poultry retail price margin 
relative to the wholesale level of poultry products becomes smaller immediately after an 
HPAI outbreak (or shock) and then becomes wider with the recovery of poultry consumption. 
However, the results show that the magnitude of market power is relatively low in the poultry 
markets. Further work could be done to analyze the potential impacts of market power by 
relaxing the assumption that total expenditure on all meat products is fixed. Moreover, 
sensitivity of these simulation results could be extended to examine the effects at a regional 
level. Additionally, a model with more time granularity (smaller time steps than one quarter) 
would be of interest to better describe and understand the price volatility that might occur 
with a shock such as HPAI.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A-1. Assumptions used in scenario analysis 
 
 
Broiler scenarios
 
Range  
  
Outbreak 
duration 
(days)  
 Broilers 
infected  
 Fraction 
broiler 
industry 
infected  
Fraction of broiler 
industry affected 
by export bans 
exported 
Export 
ban 
duration 
(days) 
Consumer 
demand shift 
during 
outbreak 
Consumer 
demand shift, in 
quarter 
following 
outbreak 
low 90 2,500,000 0.2% 10% 135 5% 0% 
med 180 5,000,000 0.4% 25% 270 8% 0% 
high 270 10,000,000 0.7% 50% 405 14% 10% 
Layer scenarios
Range 
  
Outbreak 
duration 
(days)  
 Layers 
infected  
 Fraction 
layer 
industry 
infected  
Fraction of broiler 
industry affected 
by export bans 
exported 
Export 
ban 
duration 
(days) 
Consumer 
demand shift 
during 
outbreak 
Consumer 
demand shift, in 
quarter 
following 
outbreak 
low 90 1,475,060 0.5% 10% 135 5% 0% 
med 180 14,750,600 5.0% 10% 270 8% 0% 
high 270 29,500,000 10.0% 10% 405 14% 10% 
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Table A-2. Broiler sector simulation results for the high-range scenario (baseline and 0% export diversion) 
 
  
Broilers unit 2000.00 2000.25 2000.50 2000.75 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Baseline 
Per Capita Consumption  Retail lb 23.46 23.85 22.99 22.68 23.42 24.86 25.40 26.34 
Export Thousand lbs 1135383.7 1189349.8 1275979.6 1317640.6 1388821.1 1201783.1 1230003.2 1014866.8 
Ending Stock Thousand lbs 795596.0 811422.0 815723.0 810293.0 682990.5 798225.3 662037.5 604163.5 
Wholesale Price $/cwt 54.58 55.70 56.81 57.56 59.11 55.52 61.96 76.25 
Retail Price $/lb 1.53 1.56 1.57 1.55 1.58 1.62 1.62 1.71 
Production Thousand lbs 7603368.0 7754304.0 7593955.0 7543544.0 7816452.2 8059930.5 8187249.0 8343283.0 
Total Value  (Retail 
Price*Production) Thousand $ 11662761 12095972 11919678 11688814 12327614 13044947 13290221 14275113 
Scenario ( high 0 xd) 
Per Capita Consumption  Retail lb 25.35 24.96 23.63 23.77 23.22 24.79 25.45 26.34 
Export Thousand lbs 583927.6 609507.0 651291.2 670485.5 1299213.4 1201115.4 1229662.0 1014419.2 
Ending Stock Thousand lbs 813722.2 825608.7 827587.7 820476.6 682612.1 797899.9 661874.5 604000.0 
Wholesale Price $/cwt 11.62 22.60 30.48 38.41 67.26 57.16 62.41 77.11 
Retail Price $/lb 0.99 1.06 1.12 1.16 1.61 1.64 1.63 1.73 
Production Thousand lbs 7585902.1 7472632.4 7140643.7 7191648.7 7608896.0 8040145.5 8200621.4 8342146.0 
Total Value  (Retail 
Price*Production) Thousand $ 7513701 7946950 8029144 8335680 12234584 13192615 13405573 14398132 
Change of Total Value Thousand $ -4149059 -4149022 -3890534 -3353134 -93030 147668 115353 123019 
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Table A-3. Layer sector simulation results for the high-range scenario (baseline and 0% export diversion) 
 
Layers unit 2000.00 2000.25 2000.50 2000.75 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Baseline 
Per Capita 
Consumption  Dozen 5.96 5.75 5.77 6.16 5.97 5.96 6.02 5.93 
Export Thousand Dozen 41037.93 37366.58 44717.83 48023.82 47485.22 43496.10 36490.88 30773.74 
Ending Stock Thousand Dozen 10626.42 10711.47 10952.16 11367.50 11466.21 9702.35 13208.43 14238.04 
Wholesale Price Cents/ dozen 68.07 66.05 68.80 86.05 70.35 69.24 79.16 89.45 
Retail Price $/ dozen 0.96 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.93 1.03 1.24 1.50 
Production Millions   1760166.7 1748833.3 1758166.7 1793833.3 1796895.8 1817645.8 1824104.2 1833083.3 
Total Value  (Retail 
Price*Production) Thousand $ 140226611 127713412 130934579 138723111 139140794 156402277 189405025 229696243 
Scenario ( high 0 xd) 
Per Capita 
Consumption  Dozen 5.70 5.27 5.17 5.70 5.84 5.96 6.02 5.93 
Export Thousand Dozen 38087.3 34240.4 40645.4 43549.1 46726.2 43478.5 36490.8 30774.3 
Ending Stock Thousand Dozen 10682.9 10754.4 10979.1 11388.1 11448.3 9701.4 13208.4 14238.1 
Wholesale Price Cents/ dozen 54.59 60.89 66.95 84.97 75.73 69.58 79.18 89.46 
Retail Price $/ dozen 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.98 1.03 1.24 1.50 
Production Millions   1685061.7 1614044.7 1589358.3 1664304.7 1758676.5 1815651.2 1824092.5 1833121.9 
Total Value  (Retail 
Price*Production) Thousand $ 109807854 105479551 110381395 121848890 143109572 156633343 189406040 229688108 
Change of Total Value Thousand $ -30418757 -22233861 -20553184 -16874221 3968778 231067 1015 -8135 
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Table A-4. Chicken’s total value (with and without market power) 
 
 
 
  
Year 
Total Value 
(Thousand $) 
(A) 
Total Value 
(Thousand $) 
(B) 
Difference 
(Thousand $) 
(B-A) 
 
Percentage change 
(%) 
((B-A)/A*100) 
2000.00 7530444.3 7513701.5 -16742.8 -0.222 
2000.25 7962746.9 7946950.1 -15796.9 -0.198 
2000.50 8045606.1 8029143.6 -16462.4 -0.205 
2000.75 8351977.2 8335680.2 -16297.1 -0.195 
2001.00 11233413.0 11234249.3 836.3 0.007 
2001.25 12030931.7 12029508.8 -1422.9 -0.012 
2001.50 12739123.9 12743343.1 4219.2 0.033 
2001.75 12944686.4 12954209.3 9522.9 0.074 
2002.00 12681005.2 12690917.7 9912.6 0.078 
2002.25 13167207.6 13177024.0 9816.4 0.075 
2002.50 13671533.5 13699751.7 28218.2 0.206 
2002.75 13172967.7 13197754.3 24786.7 0.188 
2003.00 12400530.9 12419457.9 18927.0 0.153 
2003.25 13505642.8 13534522.5 28879.7 0.214 
2003.50 13830233.4 13860031.7 29798.3 0.215 
2003.75 13811804.1 13830231.7 18427.7 0.133 
2004.00 13969827.6 13988586.4 18758.8 0.134 
2004.25 14795833.7 14812960.9 17127.2 0.116 
Note: A-without Market Power; B-with Market Power 
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Table A-5. Wholesale price, retail price and price margin before and after shocks 
 (unit: cents/lb)-poultry 
 
 
  
Year  0wp   0rp   1wp   1rp   1 0w wp p− 1 0r rp p−   0 0r wp p− 1 1r wp p−  
( )
( )
1 1
0 0
  r w
r w
p p
p p
−
− −
2000.00 54.58 153.39 11.62 99.05 -42.96 -54.34 98.81 87.42 -11.38
2000.25 55.70 155.99 22.66 106.35 -33.05 -49.64 100.29 83.69 -16.60 
2000.50 56.81 156.96 30.48 112.44 -26.33 -44.52 100.15 81.96 -18.19
2000.75 57.56 154.95 38.41 115.91 -19.14 -39.04 97.39 77.49 -19.90
2001.00 57.76 156.06 69.91 157.26 12.15 1.21 98.29 87.35 -10.94
2001.25 59.25 155.46 65.66 155.46 6.41 0.00 96.21 89.81 -6.41
2001.50 61.09 159.15 67.84 163.12 6.75 3.98 98.06 95.29 -2.78
2001.75 58.35 160.19 65.62 167.32 7.28 7.13 101.84 101.70 -0.14
2002.00 55.98 160.16 58.64 163.26 2.66 3.10 104.18 104.62 0.44
2002.25 56.11 160.00 55.56 159.66 -0.55 -0.34 103.89 104.10 0.21 
2002.50 56.28 162.81 59.65 167.01 3.37 4.20 106.53 107.36 0.83 
2002.75 53.71 164.43 54.78 166.41 1.07 1.98 110.72 111.63 0.91
2003.00 60.32 159.06 59.55 158.79 -0.77 -0.27 98.74 99.25 0.51
2003.25 59.59 160.88 61.86 164.03 2.27 3.15 101.29 102.17 0.88
2003.50 63.36 162.17 64.24 163.94 0.88 1.77 98.81 99.70 0.89
2003.75 64.58 167.20 63.98 167.12 -0.60 -0.08 102.62 103.14 0.52
2004.00 73.19 168.95 74.49 170.92 1.31 1.97 95.76 96.43 0.67
2004.25 79.31 173.24 79.72 174.27 0.41 1.02 93.93 94.54 0.61 
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Table A-6. Wholesale price, retail price and price margin before and after shocks 
 (unit: cents/lb)-layer 
 
  
Year  0wp   0rp   1wp   1rp   1 0w wp p−   1 0r rp p− 0 0r wp p− 1 1r wp p−  
( )
( )
1 1
0 0
  r w
r w
p p
p p
−
− −
2000.00 68.07 95.60 54.59 78.20 -13.48 -17.40 27.53 23.61 -3.92 
2000.25 66.05 87.63 60.89 78.42 -5.15 -9.21 21.59 17.53 -4.06 
2000.50 68.80 89.37 66.95 83.34 -1.85 -6.03 20.57 16.39 -4.18
2000.75 86.05 92.80 84.97 87.86 -1.08 -4.94 6.75 2.89 -3.86 
2001.00 79.14 94.67 90.80 105.35 11.66 10.68 15.53 14.55 -0.98
2001.25 67.73 94.30 73.45 99.47 5.72 5.17 26.57 26.01 -0.55
2001.50 63.70 90.23 66.36 92.59 2.66 2.36 26.54 26.23 -0.30 
2001.75 70.82 92.53 72.32 93.75 1.50 1.21 21.71 21.43 -0.28
2002.00 71.68 99.07 72.39 99.66 0.71 0.59 27.38 27.27 -0.12
2002.25 61.65 100.63 62.01 100.91 0.36 0.28 38.98 38.91 -0.08 
2002.50 66.32 103.27 66.50 103.40 0.18 0.13 36.95 36.90 -0.05
2002.75 77.33 109.83 77.43 109.89 0.10 0.06 32.51 32.46 -0.04
2003.00 68.19 119.10 68.24 119.12 0.05 0.02 50.91 50.88 -0.03 
2003.25 65.66 111.30 65.69 111.30 0.02 0.00 45.64 45.61 -0.02
2003.50 80.14 122.80 80.15 122.79 0.01 -0.01 42.66 42.64 -0.02
2003.75 102.63 144.57 102.64 144.56 0.00 -0.01 41.93 41.92 -0.01 
2004.00 106.61 159.37 106.61 159.36 0.00 -0.01 52.76 52.75 -0.01
2004.25 72.30 141.50 72.30 141.49 0.00 -0.01 69.20 69.19 -0.01
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                  Figure A-1. Young chicken exports                          Figure A-2. Young chicken ending stock 
 
       
          Figure A-3. Per capital chicken consumption                     Figure A-4. Young chicken production 
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               Figure A-5. Wholesale chicken price                       Figure A-6.  Retail chicken price 
 
 
                     Figure A-7. Total chicken value                                                                       
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                       Figure A-8. Egg exports                                           Figure A-9. Egg ending stock 
 
       
             Figure A-10. Per capita egg consumption                          Figure A-11. Egg production 
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                   Figure A-12. Wholesale egg price                                 Figure A-13. Retail egg price 
 
 
                          Figure A-14. Total egg value 
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